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Epistemic Responsibility And Testimony Pdf

epistemic responsibility and testimony pdf

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In debates about trust and testimony, epistemologists have traditionally been divided into two groups: those who hold that accepting the testimony of other people should be a kind of credulity without evidence anti-reductivism and those who assert that we shouldn't recognize any testimony as true or justified without appropriate evidence reductivism.

In debates about trust and testimony, epistemologists have traditionally been divided into two groups: those who hold that accepting the testimony of other people should be a kind of credulity without evidence anti-reductivism and those who assert that we shouldn't recognize any testimony as true or justified without appropriate evidence reductivism. I will argue in favour of the evidentialist position about trust, or the stance that epistemically responsible trust is a matter of evidence, but also in favour of the thesis that the position assumed by anti-reductivists is not necessarily an anti-evidentialist position. The crucial difference between anti-reductivism and reductivism does not pertain to the question of evidence, but to epistemic agency.

Testimony, Trust, and Authority

Please contact mpub-help umich. For more information, read Michigan Publishing's access and usage policy. Testimony is a source of knowledge. North Korea might make a declaration about its missile programme, the church about the ordination of women priests, the council about its deficit, the research group about its findings, and so on. We will look at a few examples in detail shortly, but the starting point is that social groups can be a source of testimony, and we can learn things from such collective testimony.

Of course, besides the word of the speaker, hearers also causally depend on believing testimony on other fundamental sources of knowledge like perception, memory, learning, and inference. Can the reliability of testimony be justified by appeal to these sources? This question represents the dominant epistemological problem of testimony—is testimony an autonomous source of epistemic authority? Reductionists answer negatively. They are opposed by anti-reductionists who hold, characteristically on a priori grounds, that testimony is a source of warrant in itself, not reducible to warrant derived from these other sources, even if empirically dependent on them. Assertion puts forth a proposition that the speaker represents as true see the entry on assertion , on norms of assertion, Rescorla :.

In this paper, I explore what gives collective testimony its epistemic credentials, through a critical discussion of three competing accounts of the epistemology of collective testimony. The second view denies any necessary connection to belief, claiming instead that the epistemic credentials of collective testimony derive from the reliability or truth-conduciveness of the statement that expresses the testimony. Finally, the third view claims that the epistemic credentials of collective testimony derive from the fact that it involves undertaking a collective commitment to trustworthiness, which makes the group susceptible to rebuke and blame if its testimony is not trustworthy. I argue that this last account holds the most promise for preserving what is distinctive about testimonial knowledge while still underwriting a robust epistemology of collective testimony. We often learn, that is, we acquire knowledge, from groups. In fact, there are various kinds of groups whose primary function is to serve as a source of knowledge—think, for example, of the weather bureau, or a commission of inquiry, or a scientific research team.

Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy

We get a great number of our beliefs from what others tell us. The epistemology of testimony concerns how we should evaluate these beliefs. Here are the main questions. When are the beliefs justified, and why? When do they amount to knowledge, and why? When someone tells us p , where p is some statement, and we accept it, then we are forming a testimonially-based belief that p. Testimony in this sense need not be formal testimony in a courtroom; it happens whenever one person tells something to someone else.

The Onlife Manifesto pp Cite as. The challenge to locate responsibility in ever more entangled and dynamic socio-technical environments is a key concern of the ONLIFE Manifesto. This contribution focuses specifically on responsibilities in processes of knowing, a topic which is discussed under the heading of epistemic responsibility in philosophy. I argue that two perspectives regarding epistemic responsibility should be distinguished: 1 the individualistic perspective, focusing on individuals as knowers within increasingly complex and dynamic socio-technical epistemic systems and 2 the governance perspective, focusing on the question how systems and environments should be designed so that individuals can act responsibly. Different fields of research have offered valuable insights for the development of a notion of epistemic responsibility in a hyperconnected era, most notably the fields of social epistemology, philosophy of computing as well as feminist theory of science and technology.

epistemic responsibility and testimony pdf

Distributed Epistemic Responsibility in a Hyperconnected Era

Теперь предстояло принять решение. Бросить все и ехать в аэропорт. Вопрос национальной безопасности.

North Dakota. Северная Дакота. - Северная Дакота. Разумеется, это кличка.

Epistemology of Testimony

Кассирша сощурилась. - Вашей возлюбленной пятнадцать лет. - Нет! - почти крикнул Беккер.  - Я хотел сказать… - Чертовщина.  - Если бы вы согласились мне помочь. Это так важно.

Я читал все его мозговые штурмы. Мозговые штурмы. Сьюзан замолчала. По-видимому, Стратмор проверял свой план с помощью программы Мозговой штурм. Если кто-то имеет возможность читать его электронную почту, то и остальная информация на его компьютере становится доступной… - Переделка Цифровой крепости - чистое безумие! - кричал Хейл.  - Ты отлично понимаешь, что это за собой влечет - полный доступ АНБ к любой информации.  - Сирена заглушала его слова, но Хейл старался ее перекричать.


mony as a joint action creates epistemic duties and responsibilities and the eventual success Keywords: testimony, social epistemology, joint actions, trust. 1.


Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa

 - Червь преодолел уже половину пути. - Забудьте про пленку, - сказал Бринкерхофф.  - Вводите ключ и кончайте со всем. Джабба вздохнул. На сей раз голос его прозвучал с несвойственным ему спокойствием: - Директор, если мы введем неверный ключ… - Верно, - прервала его Сьюзан.  - Если Танкадо ничего не заподозрил, нам придется ответить на ряд вопросов.

Он не заметил в АНБ ни одного существа женского пола. - Вас это смущает? - раздался у него за спиной звонкий голос. Беккер обернулся и тотчас почувствовал, что краснеет. Он уставился на карточку с личными данными, приколотыми к блузке стоявшей перед ним женщины. Глава Отделения криптографии АНБ была не просто женщиной, а очень привлекательной женщиной.

 Самопроизвольный взрыв? - ужаснулась Соши.  - Господи Иисусе. - Ищите.  - Над ними склонился Фонтейн.  - Посмотрим, что у них. Соши начала просматривать документ.

Жемчугами из Майорки. - Неужели из Майорки. Вы, должно быть, много путешествуете.

Почти уже спустившись, Стратмор остановился, нащупывая последнюю ступеньку. Когда он ее нашел, каблук его ботинка громко ударился о кафельную плитку пола. Сьюзан почувствовала, как напряглось все его тело. Они вступили в опасную зону: Хейл может быть где угодно. Вдали, за корпусом ТРАНСТЕКСТА, находилась их цель - Третий узел.

2 Comments

  1. Sereno E.

    14.04.2021 at 00:00
    Reply

    Much of what we know is acquired by taking things on the word of other people whom we trust and treat as authorities concerning what to believe.

  2. Solomon A.

    16.04.2021 at 18:03
    Reply

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